Author: corwin

Site administrative account, so probably Corwin, Felix or DD-B.

Reen

I was half an hour outside of Minneapolis last Thursday when I got a call from my youngest daughter saying that her mother, my estranged wife,  had died.  None of us had expected this.   She died of congestive heart failure.  She would have been delighted, because this meant breast cancer didn’t get her.

Her mother died of breast cancer when she was 11, which left  Reen to support her father emotionally, logistically, and often financially.  When I met her she was 16 years old and was holding a full-time job as well as managing the household accounts and seeing to her father’s medical care.  When we married, I was 18 and she was 17.  Looking back, I believe I wanted someone to take care of me the way Reen was taking care of her father–I’d been on my own for about a year, and I wasn’t especially good at it.  I believe Reen, on the other hand, wanted someone to finally take the burden off her and let her relax a bit.

Not such a good start.  All she knew of love came from “I Love Lucy” and Carrie Grant movies–and I didn’t know nearly enough to contend with that.  But we were together for 10 years, and produced four amazing children.

She created the character of Aliera, and you can still see her in it.  When I was laid off from a programming job in 1980, she told me to take six months off and write a book, so I did; that’s why Jhereg exists.  We met Bob Weir of the Grateful Dead, and Reen gave him a tarot reading, while I stood there with my mouth open.  She found my old high school manuscript of my first attempt at To Reign In Hell and made me actually write the thing.  When I became interested in music, she got behind it and pushed.  How much of what I’ve accomplished came from her?  There’s no way to know.  A lot, though.

The Reen I married was like no one else I’ve met.  Together with the solid, down-to-earth sense of responsibility, was a sense of fun, a sense of enthusiasm that I found irresistible–as did others who crossed her path.  She found people–Martin, John, Mark–and pulled them into her world because her world was so attractive, so bright, so full of profound wonder.  As she changed, and that part of her was gradually buried under health problems, pot smoke,and borderline schizophrenia, still, every once in a while it would show up and amaze anyone who was around.

We live in a world where, in addition to wonder, there are also mortgage payments, and car insurance, and medical bills, and food costs.  Over the years, she went from the one who could handle all of that, to the one who needed it handled.  I don’t understand how that happened, and I probably never will; but Martin was there, and so she and the children got what they needed.  And because of that, I was able to focus on telling stories.  Those of you reading this who enjoy my work should say, “Thank you, Martin.”  Because, without him, at best there wouldn’t be as much of it.

When we learned from the autopsy that her heart was twice the normal size, everyone had the same reaction: That’s about right. Everything about her changed over the years, often becoming its opposite.  Everything, that is, but this: she inspired love, because she gave it so willingly.  And I think, even with all that went wrong, and even with all the could-have-beens, she made those in her life better people.  At the end of the day, that’s not so little.

Truisms rot brains; absolute truisms rot brains absolutely

Once again I’ve come across the old saw, “power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely.”  Most of us first encountered it in Orwell’s 1984, where it was used to avoid questions the author preferred not to address, but it predates that.  I’m not sure, but I think the original form says authority instead of power.  But what came to mind on this occasion was: why is this unscientific idea so attractive to certain layers, and what social role does it play?

The first question one must ask is, what does “corrupt” mean in this context?  My American Heritage dictionary tells me that the verb, “to corrupt” means “to destroy or subvert the honesty or integrity of.” Presumably, if the line means anything at all, it means that power or authority destroys or subverts the honesty or integrity of the person who holds it.

But, with this definition, it is obvious that it is far from universal. History abounds with examples of individuals in power who were not corrupted in any meaningful way.  The USA in particular is rich in examples: George Washington, who stepped down from his position of authority; Abraham Lincoln, who invariably put his duty as he saw it ahead of his personal desires; Malcom X, who, whatever his political limitations, attempted to convince with ideas rather than use his personal authority.  Other cases that come to mind for me include Lenin, who never made any attempt to circumvent the soviets or the Central Committee, but instead always worked to convince others of the correctness of his policies; and Trotsky, who, at the time of Lenin’s death, was perfectly positioned to simply use the Red Army to take power.  I’m sure most of you can find other examples without looking very hard.

No one who has expressed this idea has ever given the least hint of a scientific explanation for it.  Is it something in the biological make-up of the human being?  If so, what exactly?  Where did it come from, how does it operate?  Is it social?  If so, again, what is the mechanism; what social forces cause this?  Instead of an explanation, we get a truism, and one that doesn’t hold up empirically, much less theoretically.

So—why is it so ubiquitous?  Any idea that persists, whether it is right or wrong, serves a social function.  I think the function of this idea is the one that Orwell so skillfully used it for: to avoid dealing with difficult questions.  That is, the tough question is not, “why is the individual holding power being evil,” but, “how did we find ourselves in a situation where a single individual HAS such power?”  This latter question cannot, alas, be answered by a truism, but requires careful investigation of the circumstances: In Hitler’s case, for example, we have to look at the failure of the German revolutions of 1919 and 1923, the financial backing of the Nazis, &c.  In the case of Stalin, we look at the condition of the Soviet Union after WWI, at the wars of intervention,  at the failures of the revolutions in England, France, Hungary, and Poland.  It is difficult, complicated, and can’t be expressed in a simple formula.  However, if one can skip all of this by simply reciting a clever-sounding phrase, then one can avoid the hard work.

It’s so much easier that way.  Provided one cares nothing for truth.

Capital Volume 1 Part 1 Chapter 1 Section 3A2b

This subsection is “Quantitative determination of Relative value”

Page 53: “Every commodity, whose value it is intended to express, is a useful object of a given quantity, as 15 bushels of corn, or 100 lbs of coffee.  And a given quantity of any commodity contains a definite quantity of human labour.  The value-form must therefore not only express value generally, but also value in definite quantity.  Therefore, in the value-relation of commodity A to commodity B, of the linen to the coat, not only is the latter, as value in general, made the equal in quality of linen, but a definite quantity of coat (1 coat) is made the equivalent of a definite quantity (20 yards) of linen.”

This is a restatement and summary of the earlier subsections: the equivalent form asserts qualitative equality in that human-labor = human labor, and quantitative equality (x of commodity A = y of commodity B).

“The equation 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies that the same quantity of value-substance (congealed labor) is embodied in both; that  the two commodities have each cost the same amount of labour of the same quantity of labour-time.  But the labour-time necessary for the production of 20 yards of linen or 1 coat varies with every change in the productiveness of weaving or tailoring.  We have now to consider the influence of such changes on the quantitative aspect of the expression of relative value.”

If the amount of labor embodied in a commodity determines the value of the commodity, then we need to determine how changes in the productivity of labor affects the value.

“I. Let the value of the linen vary, that of the coat remaining constant.  If, say in consequence of the exhaustion of flax-growing soil, the labour-time necessary for the production of linen be doubled, the value of the linen will also be doubled.  Instead of the equation, 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, we should have 20 yards of linen = 2 coats, since one coat would now contain only half the labour time embodied in 20 yards of linen.  If, on the other hand, in consequence, say, of improved looms, this labour-time be reduced by one-half, the value of the linen would fall by one-half.  Consequently, we should have 20 yards of linen = 1/2 coat.  The relative value of commodity A, i.e., its value expressed in commodity B, rises and falls directly as the value of A, the value of B being constant.”

As productivity increases, less labor is required to produced commodity A, therefore the value of A falls compared to B.

“II. Let the value of the linen remain constant, while the value of the coat varies.  If, under these circumstances, in consequence, for instance, of a poor crop of wool, the labour-time necessary for the production of a coat becomes doubled, we have instead of 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, 20 yards of linen = 1/2 coat.  If, on the other hand, the value of coat sinks by one-half, then 20 yards of linen = 2 coats.  Hence, if the value of  commodity A remains constant, its relative value expressed in commodity B rises and falls inversely as the value of B.

The obvious corollary to the above.

“If we compare the different cases in I. and II., we see that the same change of magnitude in relative value may arise from totally opposite causes.  Thus, the equation 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, becomes 20 yards of linen = 2 coats, either, because the value of the linen has doubled, or because the value of the coat has fallen by one-half, or because the value of the linen as doubled.”

“III. Let the quantities of labour-time respectively necessary for the production of the linen and the coat vary simultaneously in the same direction and the same proportion…”

Well, yeah, double them both, and there’s no change.  Cut them both in half, and there’s no change.  Seems clear enough.

“IV. The labour-time respectively necessary for the production of the linen and the coat, and therefore the value of these commodities may simultaneously vary in the same direction, but at unequal rates, or in opposite directions, or in other ways.  The effect of all these possible different variations, on the relative value of a commodity,  may be deduced from the results of I.,  II., and III.”

This seems pretty obvious.  It also gladdens my heart to see that old Marx was a believer in the serial comma.

“Thus real changes in the magnitude of value are neither unequivocally nor exhaustively reflected in their relative expression, this is, in the equation expressing the magnitude of relative value.  The relative value of a commodity may vary, although its value remains constant.  Its relative value may remain constant although its value varies; and, finally, simultaneous variation in the magnitude of value and in that of its relative expression by no means necessarily correspond in amount.”

This is a straightforward extension of the two theses: value of a commodity is determined by the amount of labor, and value is expressed relative to other commodities.

Capital Volume 1 Part 1 Chapter 1 Section 3A2.

This subsection is called “The Relative form of value” and begins with ” (a.) The nature and import of this form.”

Page 49: “In order to discover how the elementary expression of the value of a commodity lies hidden in the value-relation of the two commodities, we must, in the first place, consider the latter entirely apart from its quantitative aspect.  The usual mode of procedure is generally the reverse, and in the value-relation nothing is seen but the proportion between definite quantities of two different sorts of commodities that are considered equal to each other.  It is apt to be forgotten that the magnitudes of different things can be compared quantitatively, only when those magnitudes are expressed in terms of the same unit.  It is only as expressions of such a unit that they are of the same denomination, and therefore commensurable.”

We’re looking, then, for the “elementary expression of the value of a commodity” as it exists in the value-relation, or, I guess, comparison, of two commodities.  The first thing, then, is make the observation that, in order for two things to be comparable in quantity, we have to use the same form of measurement, or the same unit, for both of them–trying to compare the height of a tree with the weight of a truck is rarely useful.  We measure the height of trees, or of any two objects whose height we wish to compare, in, for example, feet.

“Whether 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or =20 coats or =x coats–that is, whether a given quantity of linen is worth few or many coats, every statement implies that the linen and coats, as magnitudes of value, are expressions of the same unit, things of the same kind.  Linen=coat is the basis of the equation.”

Page 50: “But the two commodities whose identity of quality is thus assumed, do not play the same part.  It is only the value of the linen that is expressed.  And how?  By its reference to the coat as as its equivalent, as something that can be exchanged for it….in this relation the coat is the mode of existence of value, is value embodied, or only as such is it the same as the linen.”

The value of the linen is determined by the coat, by saying that we can exchange the coat for it and will be exchanging equal values.

“On the other hand, the linen’s own value comes to the front, receives independent expression, for it is only as being value that it is comparable with the coat…”  Thus, the coat reveals the value of the linen.

“If we say that, as values, commodities are mere congelations of human labour, we reduce them by our analysis, it is true, to the abstraction, value; but we ascribe to this value no form apart from their bodily form.  It is otherwise in the value-relation of one commodity to another.  Here, the one stands forth in its character of value by reason of it’s relation to the other.”

When we discuss value by comparing one commodity to another, we find that value because it is makes then equal.  When looking at value by itself, within a single, given commodity, we do so by abstracting out all characteristics of that commodity except that it is the embodiment of human labor.

“Now, it is true that the tailoring, which makes the coat, is concrete labour of a different sort from the weaving which makes the linen.  But the act of equating it to the weaving, reduces the tailoring to that which is really equal in the two kinds of labour, to their common character of human labour.  In this roundabout way, then, the fact is expressed, that weaving, also, in so far as it weaves value, has nothing to distinguish it from tailoring, and, consequently, is abstract human labour.  It is the expression of equivalence between different sorts of commodities that alone brings into relief the specific character of value-creating labour, and that it does by actually reducing the different varieties of labour embodied in the different kinds of commodities to their common quality of human labour in the abstract.”

Here we have a footnote, in which Marx cites Ben Franklin, quoting him as saying, “Trade in general being nothing else but the exchange of labour for labour, the value of all things is…most justly measured by labour.”  The point, here, is that, just as we are able to reduce the linen and the coat to values because they embody human in labor, so, too, the labor of producing them is, economically, reduced to abstract human labor.

Page 51: “Human labour-power in motion, or human labour, creates value, but is not itself value.  It becomes value only in its congealed state, when embodied in the form of some object.  In order to express the value of the linen as a congelation of human labour, that value must be expressed as having objective existence, as being something materially different from the linen itself, and yet a something common to the linen and all other commodities.  The problem is already solved.”

“In the production of the coat, human labour-power, in the shape of tailoring, must have been actually expended.  Human labour is therefore accumulated in it.  In this aspect, the coat is a depository of value.  In this aspect the coat is a depository of value, but though worn to a thread, it does not let this fact show through.  And as equivalent of the linen in the value equation, it exists under this aspect alone, counts therefore as embodied value, as a body that is value.  A, for instance, cannot be “your majesty” to B,unless at the same time majesty in B’s eyes assumes the bodily form of A, and, what is more, with every new father of the people, changes its features, hair, and many other things besides.

“Hence, in the value equation, in which the coat is the equivalent of the linen, the coat officiates as the form of value.  The value of the commodity linen is expressed by the bodily form of the commodity coat, and the value of one by the use-value of the other.  As a use-value, the linen is something palpably different from the coat; as value, it is the same as the coat, and now has the appearance of a coat.  The fact that it is value, is made manifest by its equality with the coat, just as the sheep’s nature of a Christian is shown in his resemblance to the Lamb of God.”

Irony?  Oh, we don’t get that here.

The value of commodities is revealed by their relationship to other commodities.  The bodily form of A is the value-form of B.  This is the form of relative value–ie, relative to another commodity, expressed in terms of another commodity.