Anti-Dühring Part 1: Prefaces

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The first sections of Anti-Dühring were released in the German socialist press in 1877.  The point of the prefaces is to establish a context, both for the original work and the new editions.  In part, this includes what was happening in German philosophy at the time. It was, in a sense, a “fad” within scientific and philosophical circles, to create all-embracing “systems” that explained everything. It’s certainly understandable; the middle-late 19th Century spanned the period from the threshold of breakthroughs in nearly all of the physical sciences, to the time when such breakthroughs became commonplace. Before this period, it was still unknown how the transformation of the form of motion (for example, the emission of steam to the raising of a given weight a given distance) changed the calculation necessary to determine the quantity of motion; by the end of it, these laws were an accepted part of physics and casually used to make other calculations. In the middle of this period of discovery, it would be an almost irresistible temptation to come with a Grand Theory of Everything, and many people did–particularly those who had no knowledge of anything. Let us recall that Herr Dühring’s expertise–such as it was–was in the law. While this ought not to qualify him to speak of biology, physics, economics, &c, he was by no means alone in believing otherwise. In this, of course, nothing has changed.

This was also, more significantly, still early in the formation of German, and international, socialism.  The Reichsbank, and all it said about German Imperialism, was only a year old. The Communist Manifesto, with its promise of a scientific basis for socialism, was not yet 30 years old; the first volume of Capital, which delivered on that promise, only ten.  Russia and Turkey were gearing up for war.  The ideas of Socialism were spreading throughout Europe fast enough that in only a year Germany would declare them illegal–which would, naturally, spur their growth even more.

If you have a rapidly growing movement based on difficult and complex political principles, it is very nearly foreordained that a great deal of confusion over those principles will occur.  The tradition of free, open, lively, and far-ranging discussion within the socialist movement–brutally interrupted by Stalinsim, reestablished by Trotskyism–dates back to this period.

In the prefaces, Engels establishes some principles that will be important in understanding the book: “to me there could be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it.”  In general, laws of motion are deduced from facts–this applies to laws governing “nature” as well as laws governing “society.”  I put quotes around those words to emphasize that, while many consider them opposites, there is, in fact, no reason to view society as anything but part of nature; hence no reason why the search for the laws of motion should be approached any differently.

Engels then goes on speak of advancements in science between 1877 and the time of the current preface (1885).  “The old rigid antagonisms, the sharp, impassable dividing lines are more and more disappearing. Since even the last ‘true’ gases have been liquefied, and since it has been proved that a body can be brought into a condition in which the liquid and the gaseous forms are indistinguishable, the aggregate states have lost the last relics of their former absolute character….” and “Whereas only ten years ago the great basic law of motion, then recently discovered, was as yet conceived merely as a law of the conservation of energy, as the mere expression of the indestructibility and uncreatability of motion, that is, merely in its quantitative aspect, this narrow negative conception is being more and more supplanted by the positive idea of the transformation of energy, in which for the first time the qualitative content of the process comes into its own, and the last vestige of an extramundane creator is obliterated.”

He was wrong about that last, of course–the ever-creative theists, once it was shown that God was not, in fact, responsible for those things “science will never answer” retreated and took a new stand on matters “science will never answer,” such as the creation of life, which held good until the twentieth century, and when that fell, it turned into vague, abstract, and meaningless questions “science will never answer.”  But in principle he was right, and for those with an interest in the history of religious thought, it is worth considering.

“And since biology has been pursued in the light of the theory of evolution, one rigid boundary line of classification after another has been swept away in the domain of organic nature. The almost unclassifiable intermediate links are growing daily more numerous, closer investigation throws organisms out of one class into another, and distinguishing characteristics which almost became articles of faith are losing their absolute validity.”

I do want to take a moment with this, because I think it is useful as a pointer to the method of dialectical materialism, which Engels will be demonstrating throughout the book: The materialist dialectic does not deny that categories exist in nature. But it does not treat those categories as rigid, inflexible, set for all time.  There is, in other words, a real difference between a liquid and a solid–between water and ice. That difference isn’t just in our heads, it reflects actual differences in nature. But water and ice can transform into one another; there can be boundary conditions that blur the lines; there is motion and transformation of categories, as well as of the things that may be contained within them.  So far, the only rigid, inflexible, permanent categorization known to exist is between science fiction and fantasy.

“The recognition that these antagonisms and distinctions, though to be found in nature, are only of relative validity, and that on the other hand their imagined rigidity and absolute validity have been introduced into nature only by our reflective minds — this recognition is the kernel of the dialectical conception of nature.”

Which is also true of society, and also true of the ideas with which we understand society.  That it, this recognition not only drives Engels’ exploration in the book, but ought to drive our own investigation of the book.  The critical approach, looking for truth that has become untruth, or categories that have changed, or discoveries that have negated what was then known, is the difference between the method of Marxism and dogmatism.

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Anti- Dühring

My three favorite Marxist works are Trotsky’s Literature and Revolution, Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, and Engels’ Anti-Dühring.  Of those, the latter is by far of the most general interest.  In it, Engels lays out of the basics of Marxist economics, sociology, and philosophy, as well as making more than a few fascinating insights into the natural sciences.  As Engels said in the Preface, “it was necessary to follow Herr Dühring into that vast territory in which he dealt with all things under the sun and with some others as well.”

It’s been at least three years since I last read it, and that’s too long.  Jenphalian and I have been talking about reading it together, and I can see no good reason not to do so here, in front of god, Texas, and everyone else.

I daresay everyone is invited, even encouraged, to participate, but I’m going to make explicit something that I never expressed during my earlier readings of Capital (which I’d like to continue if my fucking book would show up) and The Wealth of Nations: I have no special interest, in these cases, of arguing.  I’m doing these readings for my own benefit (in this case, also jenphalian’s), not to convince anyone of anything.  In my reading of Capital, I didn’t bother arguing with those who were certain that value is a product of ideas because arguing with them would not help clarify the points I was working through.  I do not doubt that this book, with its wide-ranging subject matter, will inspire vitriol and impassioned dispute from those who long ago made up their minds about Marxism.  That’s fine, and if that’s you, feel free to contribute your idiotic opinions, but I probably won’t answer unless doing so will help my own understanding.  Nevertheless, I would ask that you not respond to my observations unless you have also read the material.

Unless I forget, I’ll be sticking in cut tags for those poor souls on Livejournal.  If I can recall how those work.

Comments will account for 20% of your grade, the mid-term 30%, and the final test…oh, wait.  Never mind.

The version I’m using is here.

Reflections on Roger Zelazny

I had a good day pounding away at Hawk, and then learned that my short story, “Playing God” has sold to this anthology.  So, I’m feeling pretty good, and I’m thinking about Roger Zelazny, and I’m reflecting.

Anyone familiar with his work and mine knows that the term “influence” is a drastic understatement.  As I’ve said in other places, I knew I wanted to be a writer when I first read Lord of Light and realized that what I wanted more than anything was to make other people feel the way I felt when reading that book. (It just occurred to me that it was my friend David Dyer-Bennet who first suggested I read that one, and I’ve never said thanks. So, thanks.)

Once I got to sit around a small table in a bar at a World Fantasy Con with him and Neil Gaiman and we talked about writing for hours.  Oh my fucking god.  During that conversation, I asked him how to write a short story.  He got a mildly startled look on his face, and said, “Write the last chapter of a novel.”  I don’t think I’ve ever managed to do that, but it’s been going around in my head and generating little baby ideas ever since.

I love the way he used words–I can stop and reread a sentence of his  just for how the words make me feel.  I love his characters–I am willing to follow them around a book just to see what they’ll do.  I love his sense of structure–his story that feels balanced, that feels right even aside from how it resolves.  I love his touch for the bittersweet ending that leaves one feeling, “well, it was worth the struggle, but it didn’t come without a price.” I love his ability to humanize myth, and to mythologize humanity.

I am a process geek.  That is, I can think and talk about how writing works–and ought to work–for hours.  I love making generalizations about writing, and then testing them.  And I believe the source of that, or at least a huge part of the source, is reading Roger and saying to myself, over and over, “How does he do that?”  The fact that I’ve never gotten a satisfactory answer has done nothing to alleviate my desire to try.  After all, I’ve only been at it thirty-five years or so.  Maybe in another ten I’ll get somewhere.

I’m so glad I knew him.  I’m so glad I can still read his work.  I miss him so much.

Identity Politics and the PC Movement: An Historical Look

Idealism is the belief that ideas are primary to matter; that consciousness determines being. As a materialist, I reject it.  Really.  I mean, I try to.  I know I should.  But this voice in my head keeps whispering, “If you explain just one more time, everyone will understand and agree with you.”  This is idealism, because it ignores that my ideas flow from my conditions, and that other people’s ideas flow from theirs, and there is only a limited degree to which discussions can change ideas.  I know that.  And I will remember it.  Tomorrow.  But today, I’m going to try to explain just one more time.

In the last discussion of political correctness, David (professorperry) has quite correctly made it clear that I haven’t expressed myself well.  I don’t know why people should expect me to express myself well.  I mean, I’m only a writer for god’s sake.   Let me see if I can take a different approach to this whole thing.  It is obvious that I have given the impression that I believe the only, or at least the biggest, problem with Political Correctness is that it keeps you from doing more productive work. Let me try again.

The PC movement and the supporters of Identity Politics are closely aligned, and grew out of a very definite history. From the mid 60’s to the early 70’s, there was tremendous anger among youth, starting with outrage at the Vietnam War. Internationally, this was often anger (a healthy anger, in my opinion) directed at the US, which often turned into anger directed at their own governments. This reached a peak in France in 1968, during which time the French working class became involved on a massive scale, and international capitalism was shaken to its roots. You may not believe capitalism was ever actually threatened by the events in France, but it is very clear that capitalists did: read any major newspaper of the time.

The Vietnam War ended exactly when the student protests in the US began to spread out to include the unions. (Well, that and the military victories of the NLF.)

At the same time, it became directed at one man: Nixon, as the most extreme representative of the war, and of everything that was hateful about capitalism.

But these protests were just that–protests. They were led  by those (SDS, SWP, SMC, &c) with no theoretical training in Marxism, and often an active hostility to Marxism or, in fact, theory of any kind. For the most part, they hated capitalism, but had no idea how to get from here to there–how to go from an outraged working class, to taking control of production. Could that have happened then? Personally, I doubt it; I don’t think conditions were right. The foundations could have been built for a movement prepared for the future. Instead, because of bankrupt leadership that based itself on the middle class, on begging the ruling class to be kinder, on accepting capitalism as given, what happened was that those involved in the protest didn’t see any way forward. I still remember that day: the day Nixon resigned. There was tremendous joy–and a simultaneous emptiness.

“Now what?” was the unspoken, almost unanimous question throughout the protest movement. And because of the lack of theoretical discussion, because of the failure to break from capitalism, because of the limited aims on the part of the leadership, the answer was: massive demoralization. This demoralization fractured the protest movement into many parts, depending on the mood and inclination of the individual. Food Co-ops, the New Age, &c.

As the working class had failed to do what the middle class radicals believed it should do (“reject material things” and “embrace anarchy” and above all, “follow our lead”), the middle class radicals gave up on the working class. Now many of them started reading Heidegger, and Marcuse, and others who had been demoralized by failures of the revolutions after WWI or WWII. The demoralized youth turned for guidance to the demoralized academic.  Enter here the theories of the post-modernists.  “Wait,” they cried.  “It isn’t at all a matter of understanding the world, it is a matter of which ideas you chose to accept.  It is a question of picking the proper narrative for what you wish to accomplish.  Let us not only reject the working class as the revolutionary class, but, along with that, science as the means to understand social relations.  In fact, let us reject science altogether; it just leads to progress, and what is progress but a narrative that leads to war and prejudice and oppression?”  Of course, different elements stopped in different places along this spectrum; some still accept science as long as it is kept “in its place.”  Others are suspicious of progress, but want us to redefine it rather than reject it utterly.  What they have in common is rejection of the idea that we can understand social relations and make that understanding work for us to accomplish definite ends.

This marriage of the New Left and the Post-Modernists produced offspring as disfigured as one might expect.  One of the most vacuous pieces of New Left ideology was, “the personal is the political.” This was very attractive to middle class radicals who had given up on the working class but felt comfortable discussing what was inside of their own–and others’–heads on a very personal basis.  Combine it with substitution of “narrative” for science, and, hey presto!  We have the beginnings of what we call political correctness.

By the 1980s, when Reagan was attacking the unions and capitalism was preparing and launching efforts to destroy anything that interfered with unfettered profit–these same middle class radicals had stock portfolios, and good jobs, and tenure, and some of them had even propelled themselves out of the middle class entirely. Their rejection of the working class was easy–they’d already done it.

And then those who wanted to tell themselves they were doing good came together with those who who didn’t care about doing good, but wanted to break down the gap between the high-income middle class black and the high-income middle class white; between the high-income middle class man and the high-income middle class woman. These groups came together easily and naturally. To them, the problem is not property relations that cause oppression and poverty and bare subsistence for millions upon millions of people; the problem is inequality between different sections of the upper middle class. From there, if you believe that “the personal is the political,” it is a simple step to saying, “I will break down this inequality among the upper middle class by making sure no one uses the generic ‘he.'” Altering language becomes the substitute–not for action in the most literal sense–but for fighting to understand the world from the point of view of taking action; from fighting to actually end oppression, to fighting to reduce inequality among the privileged.

Today’s PC movement is an outgrowth of the subjective idealism of the New Left. Subjective idealism is the belief that consciousness determines being combined with a focus on the consciousness of individuals, rather than the consciousness of the masses.  Just like its empty-headed twin sibling Identity Politics, it ends up supporting capitalism, supporting oppression, and making the struggle for genuine equality more difficult.